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ESSAY

Extraterritoriality, Universal Jurisdiction, and
the Challenge of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.
VIVIAN GROSSWALD CURRANt

INTRODUCTION

Extraterritoriality and universal jurisdiction have both
overlapping and distinct characteristics. An attribute they share with
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)l is that the more one tries to pin down
their definitions, the more entangled one becomes in intersections
among the international, transnational, and national, as well as in
varying understandings of each. This situation might be compared to
"div[ing] into the fog." 2
Many thought that the U.S. Supreme Court would address
extraterritoriality under the ATS in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,3 a case
whose petition for certiorari was already filed at the time the Court
heard oral arguments in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.4 on
what should have been the issue of corporate liability under the
ATS.5 The first issue framed in the Rio Tinto petition for certiorari
t Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
Unless otherwise indicated, translations are mine.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
2. See Christian Atias, The Distinction Between Patrimonialand Extra-Patrimonial
Rights in the Economic Analysis of the Law, HENRI CAPITANT L. REv. (Dec. 1, 2010),
http://henricapitantlawreview.org/article.php?lg=en&id=254 (quoting MICHEL VILLEY, LE
DROIT ET LES DROITS DE L'HOMME (1983)).

3. 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. granted,vacated and remanded, 133 S.
Ct. 1995 (2013), dismissed on other grounds, Nos. 02-56256, 02-56390, 09-56381, 2013
WL 3357740 (9th Cir. June 28, 2013).

4. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
5. On appeal from the Second Circuit, the issues presented before the Supreme Court
were:
1. Whether the issue of corporate civil tort liability under the Alien Tort
Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, is a merits question, as it has been
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was "[w]hether U.S. courts should recognize a federal common law
claim under the ATS arising from conduct occurring entirely within
the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign, especially where the claim
addresses the foreig sovereign's own conduct on its own soil toward
its own citizens." Already at the first Kiobel oral argument, the
Court seemed noticeably more interested in asking questions about
extraterritoriality and foreign law than about corporate liability.7 A
few days later, the Court ordered a second rear Vment of Kiobel on
the sole issue of ATS extraterritorial jurisdiction.
I.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY

A. InternationalLaw
The rationale against the extraterritorial application of law arises
from the tenet that respect for the equal sovereignty of all nations
requires interdiction against the extraterritorial application of the laws
of any one nation.9 Under traditional international law, it is indeed a
basic point of departure that national law is territorial and has no
legal effect beyond its geographical borders, and that States violate
international law if they exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over
foreign conduct that does not affect matters in their territory.' 0
treated by all other courts prior to the decision below, or an issue of
subject matter jurisdiction, as the court of appeals held for the first
time.
2. Whether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of
the law of nations such as torture, extrajudicial executions or genocide,
as the court of appeals decision provides, or if corporations may be
sued in the same manner as any other private party defendant under the
ATS for such egregious violations, as the Eleventh Circuit has
explicitly held.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
6. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Rio Tinto, 671 F.3d 736 (No. 11-649).
7. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
8. On March 5, 2012, the Court ordered the parties to brief for reargument on: "Whether
and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to
recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory
of a sovereign other than the United States." Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132
S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.).
9. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 53 (2d ed. 2005).
10. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 309 (7th ed. 2008)

("The governing principle is that a state cannot take enforcement measures on the territory of
another state without the consent of the latter."); 1 EMMERICH DE VATrEL, LE DROIT DES GENS
OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS

ET DES SOUVERAINS §§ 16, 36-37 (Paris, Librairie de Guillaumin et Cie 1863) (analyzing
nations as the moral equivalents of individuals, concluding that no nation may oblige any
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Emmerich de Vattel, whose impact on U.S. law was profound
and formative through his four-volume work on The Law of Nations,
as it usually is translated, a more modem translation of which would
be "customary international law," also underscored the right of each
nation to be free from the interference of any other, even if it chooses
to behave in a manner deemed savage by others, so long as it does so
within its own borders." Vattel criticized Hugo Grotius, the Dutch
jurist, for taking the view that there was a right to perfect one's
neighbor in spite of itself: "Has not Grotius become aware that ...
his view opens the door to all of the furor of enthusiasm and
fanaticism, and furnishes the zealous with endless pretexts?"l 2
In 1912, Oppenheim's seminal treatise on international law
explained that "[sltates possessing independence and territorial as
well as personal supremacy can naturally extend or restrict their
jurisdiction as far as they like. However, as members of the Family of
Nations and International Persons, the States must exercise selfrestraint in the exercise of this natural power in the interest of one
another." 13 He further concluded that "[n]o right for a State to extend
its jurisdiction over acts of foreigners can be said to have grown up
under the Law of Nations. . . ."l4
The situation slowly changed, however. According to the French
Legal Scholar, Mireille Delmas-Marty, the break occurred not with
the end of the Second World War or the Nuremberg Trials, but with
the end of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles, which
made Kaiser Wilhelm judicially subject to extradition,15 despite the
fact that the Dutch government would refuse extradition.16 However,
in 1927, less than a decade after the First World War, the Permanent
other to conduct itself as it did not decide independently); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§§

402-404; Developments in the Law:

Extraterritoriality,124 HARV. L. REv. 1226, 1280 (2011).
11. 2 VATTEL, supra note 10, § 7; see Charles G. Fenwick, The Authority of Vattel, 8 AM.
POL. SC. REv. 375, 385 (1914).
12. 2 VATTEL, supra note 10, § 7. Author's Note: I translated "enthousiasme" as
"enthusiasm," but, given the context, imagine that in the eighteenth century, the French word
connoted something closer to fanaticism.
13. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 201-02 (2d ed. 1912).
14. Id. at 204.

15. Mireille Delmas-Marty, La responsabilit6pdnale en

dchec: prescription, amnistie,

immunitis, in JURIDICTIONS NATIONALES ET CRIMES INTERNATIONAUX 613 (Antonio Cassese
& Mireille Delmas-Marty eds., 2002).
16. CASSESE, supra note 9, at 453-54.
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Court of International Justice stated in the often-quoted Lotus case
that,
[flar from laying down a general prohibition to the
effect that States may not extend the application of
their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to
persons, property and acts outside their territory, it
leaves them in this respect a wide measure of
discretion which is only limited in certain cases by
prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State
remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as
best and most suitable. 17
Lotus's correct interpretation and significance is a hotly debated issue
today, but the successor International Court of Justice has not
repudiated the principle articulated above, although it gave the
following qualification in Barcelona Traction:
It is true that .. . international law .. . leaves to States
a wide discretion. . . . It does however (a) postulate the
existence of limits . .. and (b) involve for every State

an obligation to exercise moderation and restraint as to
the extent of the jurisdiction assumed by its courts in
cases having a foreign element, and to avoid undue
encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly
appertaining to, or more appropriately exercisable by,
another State.' 8
In particular, Lotus endorses a State's right to prescribe
extraterritorially, distinguishing between prescribing and enforcing.19
It has been observed that the international legal system endorses
relativism by virtue of the principle of equal national sovereignty,
since each State's distinct values and norms are accorded equal
validity. 20 At the same time, on a philosophical level, the
international legal order embraces the abstract universalism of reason

17. S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7).
18. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 105 (Feb. 5)
(separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).
19. See Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 19; see also Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts,
The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L. L. 142, 142 &
n.2 (2006).
20. See, e.g., MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY,
INTERNATIONALISATION DU DROIT 52 (2003).

ETUDES JURIDIQUES ET COMPARATIVES

ET
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that undergirds natural law. 2 1 Delmas-Marty advocates pluralism
without relativism, and suggests that "pluralism has its limits." 2 2
B.

United States Law

U.S. courts apply a long-standing presumption against the
extraterritorial effect of federal laws. An instance of vigorous
application came in 2010 in Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd.,2 4 a securities case involving foreign plaintiffs, a foreign
defendant, and securities sold on a foreign stock exchange. The
Supreme Court ruled that Section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act did not encompass the case under consideration. 25 The
Court first reasoned that "when a federal statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none," 26 and that
Section 10(b) of the statute was primarily focused on the acts of
purchase and sale, none of which had occurred in the United States in
the case at issue. 27 Five Justices limited Section 10(b) to "the
purchase of such a security listed on an American stock exchange,
and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States."
The next year, in J McCyntire Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,29 the
Supreme Court found that a New Jersey court lacked jurisdiction over
a British company, which had sold a product it manufactured to a
separately owned company in Ohio for distribution in the United
States.3 0 More specifically, the Court rejected the defendant's
jurisdictional argument that jurisdiction was established by the
defendant's product placement in the stream of commerce, which
targeted U.S. consumers.31 The Court found, rather, that the absence
of any other business contacts between the manufacturer and the
forum state of New Jersey was insufficient to constitute "activities in
New Jersey that reveal an intent to invoke or benefit from the

2 1. Id.
22. Id. at 120.
23. See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
24. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
25. Id.at 2881 (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997)).
26. Id. at 2878.
27. Id. at 2888.
28. Id.
29. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
30.Id.at2790-91.
3 1. Id.
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protection of its laws." 32
One perspective on the contemporary trend is that the United
States has been demonstrating "[i]ncreasing hostility towards
extraterritorialism [and that this has] culminated in Kiobel . . ."33
Morrison involved an alleged "manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance . . . ."34 "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered . . . ."3 Nicastro involved product liability in a
personal injury case when a New Jersey metal worker injured his
hand while using defendant's product, a shearing machine. 36
Although the Supreme Court majority in Kiobel evoked this line of
cases in reasoning that the ATS can have no extraterritorial
application in foreign-cubed cases, neither Morrison nor Nicastro,
unlike Kiobel, involved universal jurisdiction, or, thus, the grave
human rights violations that ATS jurisdiction signifies: jus cogens
cnmes.
In theory, universal jurisdiction must imply extraterritoriality,
but only to a strictly limited category of cases. It is this last factor that
would distinguish ATS cases, which by statutory requirement are
limited to violations of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States, 37 except for the fact that the current era of ATS suits, unlike
the prior ones, has focused primarily on multinational corporate
defendants. 3 8 Thus, although Morrison and Nicastro did not deal with
jus cogens violations, contemporary United States universal
jurisdiction cases do deal with corporations.
In Kiobel, the Second Circuit would have allowed universal
jurisdiction and extraterritoriality to proceed unabatedly, so long as
the corporate defendant could be shielded from liability.39 In 2010,
the Second Circuit held that corporate defendants were not liable
under the ATS, and that same year, the Supreme Court decided
32. Id. at 2791.
33. Jodie A. Kirshner, Why Is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational
Corporations to Europe?: Extraterritorialism,Sovereignty and the Alien Tort Statute, 30
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 259, 274 (2012). This prescient comment was made before the
Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel.
34. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010).
35. Id.
36. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
38. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
39. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2010), aff'd,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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Citizens United v. FEC,4 0 finding that corporations, like natural
people, had a First Amendment right of free expression. 4 1 When the
Court granted certiorari in Kiobel, the issue on appeal was whether
corporations could be held responsible as ATS defendants.42 The
Court decided to change the issue to that of extraterritoriality under
the ATS sua sponte, and it found that it did not need to consider the
first question, having decided the second one.4 3
In light of Citizens United, it is possible that the Court preferred
to examine whether there was a basis for limiting the ATS' scope
other than the corporate nature of the defendant, in the event that it
decided to limit the ATS, even though the Ninth Circuit had
addressed extraterritoriality in Rio Tinto and a petition for certiorari
was pending on that very issue before the Court in that case,4 4 while
in Kiobel the Second Circuit had only skimmed the issue of
extraterritoriality. 45 After deciding Kiobel, the Court vacated its writ
of certiorari in Rio Tinto and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of Kiobel.46 Not only did the majority in the
end decline to adjudicate the issue of corporate liability, but it also
analyzed extraterritoriality outside of the context of universal
jurisdiction.

II.

UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

Universal jurisdiction, arising from the idea that some crimes are
so repugnant to all humankind that any nation may try the
perpetrators, has made an important inroad into the principle against
extraterritoriality. It has been said that
universal jurisdiction [is] founded on the sheer
heinousness of certain crimes, such as genocide and
torture, which are universally condemned and which
40. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
41. Id. at 913.
42. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at i.
43. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
44. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5.
45. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), af'd, 133
S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
46. Rio Tinto, PLC, v. Sarei, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (mem.). On June 28, 2013, in
accordance with the Supreme Court remand for a ruling consistent with its opinion in Kiobel,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit against Rio Tinto in an
order without an opinion. Id.
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every state has an interest in repressing even in the
absence of traditional connecting factors..

.

. [T]hough

subject to evolution, the roster of crimes presently
covered by universal jurisdiction includes . . .
genocide, torture, some war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.4 7
In reality, contemporary universal jurisdiction cases, such as the
Nuremberg trial cases, reflect a high frequency of cooperation,
participation, and even incitement by States in which the alleged
harms occurred. Indeed, in the case that reincarnated the ATS after a
4 8 as well as those
dormancy of two centuries, Filcrtigav. Peiha-Irala,
that characterized the first generation of modern ATS cases,
defendants were State actors of foreign States. 49 In the subsequent
decades, when multinational corporations became the primary
defendants,o State actors of the States in which the alleged jus
cogens violations occurred often were alleged to be complicit or, as
in Kiobel, the corporate defendants complicit in crimes committed by
foreign State actors. 5 ' Consensus concerning the universality of the
evil involved in jus cogens crimes provides justification for the
theory of making jurisdiction universal, but logic alone makes clear
that there would be no need for universal jurisdiction if the States in
which the crimes are committed were not themselves often complicit
or, worse, the instigators and primary perpetrators.

III.

THE CHALLENGE OF KIOBEL

Kiobel involved more than international and U.S. law; it also
involved foreign domestic law and, as a consequence, questions of
comparative law. A key concern of the Court during both oral
arguments seemed to focus around the United States being alone in
allowing civil, as opposed to criminal, jurisdiction in an exercise of
extraterritorial universal jurisdiction.52 The Court repeatedly inquired
about the practice of other countries, and a perusal of amicus briefs
47. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 19, at 143.
48. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
49. See Factsheet: Alien Tort Statute, CTR. FOR CONST. RTs., http://ccrjustice.org/leammore/faqs/factsheet%3A-alien-tort-statute (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
50. See Doe v. Unocal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd, 248 F.3d 915 (9th
Cir. 2001). Doe was the first time a suit against a multinational corporation proceeded. Id.
51. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010), aff'd, 133 S.
Ct. 1659 (2013).
52. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7; Transcript of Oral
Reargument, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
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filed on behalf of defendants reflects many amici authors arguing that
the extraterritorial exercise of civil universal jurisdiction would be a
breach of international law. 53
Kiobel presents the challenge of crossing legal cultures and
categories. Just as the linguistic level is replete with false friends, 54 so
too at the legal level, appearances and categorizations are deceptive.
Our courts are in an open struggle with their manner of accessing
foreign law, as the three opinions of the Seventh Circuit in Bodum
USA, Inc. v. La Cafetidre, Inc.5 illustrated in 2010. Judges
Easterbrook and Posner set forth reasons against using party experts
as the favored method of understanding applicable law, despite their
jurisdiction's favoring that method, while their colleague, Judge
Wood, disagreed.5 6
Kiobel's foreign or comparative law element was not
immediately apparent. As an ATS case, it naturally raised issues
relating to a domestic federal statute. Since the ATS expressly deals
with violations of the law of nations, or customary international law,
the case also concerned international law. International law, however,
ultimately is an issue of how States mutually understand agreements
between themselves, and the standards that govern the international
legal system-the ordre public. It is perhaps worth noting at the
outset that, with respect to international legal standards, according to
Sir Ian Brownlie, "in principle [there is] no difference between the
problems created by the assertion of criminal and civil jurisdiction
over aliens."57 At Kiobel's second oral argument, those Justices
53. Defendants (respondents) also made this argument. The respondent's brief and amici
briefs are available from the American Bar Association. Preview of United States Supreme
Court Cases: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., AM. BAR Ass'N, http://www.american
bar.org/publications/preview home/l0-1491.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
54. Author's Note: For example, the French dventuel and German eventuell mean
possible, not eventual in English; additionally, the French actuel and German aktuell mean
current, not actual in English.
55. 621 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2010).
56. Id. at 628-29 (arguing, for the majority, against the use of experts because French
law is widely available in English); id. at 631-32 (Posner, J., concurring) (arguing that the
court is not limited to relying on testimony to determine foreign law); id at 638-39
(Wood, J., concurring) (arguing that expert testimony may be necessary in order to avoid
misinterpretation through translation). For an overview of the Bodum debate, see Frederick
Gaston Hall, Not Everything Is As Easy As a French Press: The DangerousReasoning of the
Seventh Circuit on Proofof ForeignLaw and a PossibleSolution, 43 GEO. J. INT'L. L. 1457,
1464-73 (2012).
57. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 300.
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concerned about the United States' not applying a unique law
extraterritorially5 8 asked questions from a common law
understanding of the meaning and function of civil and criminal law,
and from an assumption that this understanding was the same as that
of the rest of the world, or of the rest of the "civilized nations," since
theirs is the practice the Court attends to in determining ATS
standards. 59 In fact, the States looked to in Kiobel were primarily
Western European nations, principally Germany and France. 60 The
Netherlands and Britain were referred to inasmuch as petitioners
argued that they have civil universal jurisdiction,61 while respondents
argued to the contrary, pointing out that both of those governments
had filed amicus briefs objecting to U.S. civil extraterritorial

jurisdiction. 62
At a basic level, the civil and common law nations differentiate
between the concept of a criminal and a civil offense in a comparable
manner. Murder, for example, is a criminal offense in both systems,
unintentional torts a civil offense in both. Some acts have been
categorized as criminal offenses in one system and civil in another,
such as defamation, traditionally a criminal offense in civilian States
and a civil one in common law States, but that categorization under
the influence of globalization is not set in stone, as a challenge started
in 2008 to its criminal categorization in France demonstrates,
although it has remained unsuccessful to date.6 3
Based on the above analysis, there is little reason to question the
basic similarity of meaning when a civilian jurist and an American
one refer to criminal versus civil law, and this was the assumption of
all involved in Kiobel. After the Court asked for renewed briefing and
oral argument on the issue of extraterritoriality, this author wrote a
58. See Linda J. Silberman, Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Implications for
Global Securities Class Actions, in 12 YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 123

(2010) (discussing a similar concern in Morrison).
59. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) ("[W]e think courts
should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.").
60. See Kiobel v. Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d. Cir. 2010), aff'd, 133 S. Ct.
1659 (2013).
61. Petitioners' Supplemental Reply Brief at 17, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
62. Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 3, 40, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
63. See, e.g., Laurence de Charette & Johan Prorok, La depinalisationde la diffamation
bientdt debattue, LE FIGARO, Dec. 2, 2008, http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/
2008/12/02/01016-20081202ARTFIGOO309-la-depenalisation-de-la-diffamation-bientotdebattue-.php.
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brief on behalf of Comparative Law scholars and a French Supreme
Court Justice, who has sat both on the Constitutional Council and the
Council of State of France, to alert the Supreme Court to functional
differences in criminal and civil law in the two legal systems that are
so profound as to mean that U.S. civil universal jurisdiction is
analogous and equivalent to civilian criminal universal jurisdiction,
and that ATS extraterritorial jurisdiction is well within current
international law standards. 64
The key difference between the two legal orders is that U.S. tort
law fulfills many of the functions of civilian criminal law, while its
criminal law system would be less well-adapted to universal
jurisdiction cases. 6 5 Conversely, in civilian States, the criminal law
system affords victims opportunities similar to those that the U.S. tort
system affords, while civilian civil courts are less well-suited for
universal jurisdiction cases. In Continental Europe, the criminal
prosecutor often is part of the magistrature, called a "standing judge,"
as opposed to a "sitting" one.66 Unlike in the United States, in civilian
States, prosecutors tend to be neutral, non-partisan figures who have
no professional interest in amassing convictions, and who are trained
and obliged to garner exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence. 67
A crucial annex to the prosecutor's ability and resources to
uncover relevant evidence is the civilian system's mechanism for
victim participation in criminal trials, victim financial compensation
ensuing from them, and for victim initiation of criminal trials;
essentially, all the features of U.S. tort trials and none of the
attributes of U.S. criminal trials. Both the U.S. tort and the civilian
64. Brief of Amici Curiae Comparative Law Scholars and French Supreme Court Justice
in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491); see also Vivian Grosswald
Curran, Mass Torts and Universal Jurisdiction,34 U. PA. J.INT'L L. (forthcoming 2013).
65. See Curran, supra note 64; Vivian Grosswald Curran, Globalization, Legal
Transnationalizationand Crimes Against Humanity: The Lipietz Case, 56 AM. J. COMP. L.
363, 382-83 (2008); see also Beth Stephens, TranslatingFildrtiga: A Comparative and
International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights
Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L. L. 1, 19 (2002) (describing how many civil law systems allow
victims to seek damages as part of a criminal prosecution).
66. For France, see Loi 58-1270 du 22 D6c. 1958 portant loi organique relative au statut
de la magistrature, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=
JORFTEXT000000339259; for Belgium, see 1994 CONST. art. 15(2); and for Italy, see Art.
104 Costituzione (It.).
67. See Philip Milburn & Denis Salas, Les procureurs de la Republique: De la
compdtence personnelle a l'identitM collective, in Etude sociologique et 6tude comparative
europ6enne 137 (2007); Curran, supra note 65, at 377-78.
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criminal trial are largely victim-driven, and give victims an
opportunity to bring important issues to the public's attention. 68 By
contrast, the civilian civil trial is a private matter, often entirely in
writing, with no oral testimony whatsoever. In France in particular,
even the lawyers' submissions to courts are the intellectual property
of their authors, and unavailable to the public unless the lawyers
make them available. 69 When crimes against humanity suits have
been attempted in civil courts in some civilian States because the
plaintiffs were for technical reasons unable to pursue their suits in
criminal court, the legal and lay public both have been known to react
with considerable derision, in large measure because the plaintiffs'
selection of the civil court prevented issues of historical, political,
and social importance from being aired in public. 70
The civilian legal order also has no equivalent to the U.S. class
action suit, since class actions countermand the deeply entrenched
civilian principle that all justice must be individual. 7 1 This difference
was, moreover, an express concern of Justice Scalia in his Morrison
opinion. 72 Whereas civilian victims have access to the resources of
the State through the criminal court, they must use their own
resources to finance suits in civil court in a system, which, unlike its
U.S. counterpart, forbids U.S.-style contingency fee arrangements as
unethical.73 Moreover, civilian civil suits, unlike their U.S.
homologues, do not allow punitive damages, considering them to be
appropriate solely to criminal law.74 All things considered, the U.S.
tort suit functions in a manner analogous to the civilian criminal suit,
and conversely, for purposes of determining that the two systems
68. See JOHN BELL, FRENCH LEGAL CULTURES 141 (2001). On the importance of public
discourse to U.S. tort law, see JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL
BATTLES AND THE LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE INAMERICA (2006).
69. Curran, supra note 65, at 377.
70. See id. at 373-80.
71. See 1958 CONST. art. 66 (Fr.) (stating that members of the judiciary are guardians of
individual liberty); Nouveau code de proc6dure civile [N.C.P.C.] art. 31 (Fr.) (requiring that
the plaintiffs interest in a cause of action be direct and personal). Note also the legal maxim

that "none may plead by representation" ("nul neplaideparprocureur").
72. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2885 (2010).
73. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN LAWYERS R. 3.3 (2006) (forbidding the
contingency fee or "pactum quota litis"), available at http://anwaltverein.de/downloads/
praxis/berufsrecht/2006-code-of-conduct.pdf. The majority of EU member states have
adopted the Code of Conduct for European Lawyers. Status of the CCBE Code of Conduct at
a National Level, CCBE (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.ccbe.eulfileadmin/user_upload/NTC
document/Table adoption ofthl_1358409892.pdf.
74. See Helmut Koziol, PunitiveDamages: A EuropeanPerspective, 68 LA. L. REV. 741,
751 (2008); see also JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE,
LATIN AMERICA AND EAST ASIA 1022 (1994).
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have an operational equivalence in their respective modes of
exercising universal jurisdiction. It was in this context that the issue
of the ATS might have been considered more fruitfully, before
concluding that extraterritorial application of the ATS would make
the United States, in the words of the majority, "a uniquely hospitable
forum for the enforcement of international norms."
CONCLUSION

Modern catastrophes are ever more extraterritorial as technology
increases their breadth and reach. Human rights law is rooted in
claims of universalism, but anchored, for the most part, in the
national courts in which actions are brought. The Kiobel case was
situated at the intersection of two lines of cases. The first line was
Filartigaand its progeny, with the Supreme Court endorsing in Sosa
the applicability of the ATS to "foreign-cubed" cases of grave crimes
against humanity: namely where plaintiff and defendant are foreign,
and where the relevant acts occurred abroad. The second line harks to
the presumption that federal statutes do not have extraterritorial
application, and in recent applications includes EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil Co., 76 Nicastro,77 and Morrison.7 8 Justice Breyer's
concurring opinion in Kiobel struck a compromise between the two
lines. Without relinquishing the importance of nexus to the United
States and echoing the majority opinion and his own often articulated
concern for attending to foreign relation concerns, his concurring
opinion underscored his continuing vision of the ATS as a vehicle for
the extraterritorial application ofjus cogens law.79
It remains to be seen how norms of international law will be
carried out in the future. The era of the direct effect of international
law is in transition. European (and other, such as Canadian) States are
adopting the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Courtso in
part or whole into their national legal orders, and some, like France,
75. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668 (2013).
76. 499 U.S. 244, 277 (1991) (denying extraterritorial application of Title VII protections
to U.S. citizen while employed in Saudi Arabia).
77. 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011).
78. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
79. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
80. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
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with incremental bills to be inserted at various times as part of
national law. 8 ' It has been somewhat over half a century since the
Nuremberg trials and the events that preceded them catapulted the
individual into becoming a subject of international law, and since law
began to articulate standards of international human rights based on
the hindsight of what had gone wrong.
We have come a long way since Helmuth von Moltke, a young
German lawyer fighting the Nazi machine tooth and nail from within
the ranks of the German Abwehr, or military intelligence, saved
thousands of lives by cajoling and menacing colleagues and
superiors with the specter of an international humanitarian law that he
sometimes formulated as he went along, and at a time when Lord
Lothian, a British ambassador to the United States, could maintain
that there was no such thing as international law. 82 The role of the
multinational corporation today with traits akin to a State as well as
to a non-State actor suggest that Kiobel is only a step, and not the
final destination, in a road with many turns to come.

81. In 2010, French law incorporated the Rome Statute with respect to genocide and
crimes against humanity, Loi 2010-930 du 9 aofit 2010 portant adaptation du droit penal a
l'institution de la Cour pdnale international, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE

FRANQAISE [J.O.], Aug. 10, 2008, p. 14678, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/aff
ichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022681235&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id. A more
expansive bill is in committee. See Antoine Reverchon, Affaires criminelles, LE MONDE,
Mar. 25, 2013, http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2013/03/25/affairescriminelles_18
53684_3234.html.
82. On Lord Lothian, see MICHAEL BALFOUR & JULIAN FRISBY, HELMUTH VON MOLTKE:
A LEADER AGAINST HITLER (1972). For two accounts of von Moltke's resistance, see id. and
HELMUTH VON MOLTKE: LETTERS TO FREYA 1939-1945 (Beate Ruhm von Oppen ed. &

trans., 1990).

